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Abstract
This paper analyzes the consequences of redistribution of public funds
to rent seekers. Therefore, it introduces redistribution to rent seeking
agents into Barro’s (1990) endogenous growth model with a productive
public sector. It shows that the growth rate decreases in the share of the
public funds that is redistributed. The public sector’s relative sizes that
maximize growth and welfare become also smaller in presence of redis-
tribution. Further, if foreign aid is added to the model, the relationship
between aid and growth turns out to be inverted-U shaped under reason-
able policy assumptions, which is consistent with the finding of an Aid
Laffer Curve by some recent empirical studies.
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1 Introduction
In many countries, public funds are partly used to provide public goods and ser-
vices as well as to finance transfers to poor, sick, disabled and elderly people. In
addition, transfer payments are often made ”to farmers or agricultural interest,
to protected producers of import substitutes, to college and university students
and academic faculties, to consumers of municipal transport services, to airline
passengers, to government workers, to various and sundry other groups that can-
not qualify for inclusion under any meaningfully defined ’welfare state’ rubric”
(Buchanan 1988, 8-9). Of course, most of these payments are defended by the
argument that they are necessary either to provide important public goods or
to help people in need. But these payments are most likely primarily made
to please persistent rent seekers. Since the output shares that governments all
over the world redistribute to rent seekers seem to be far from negligible, the
question arises how this redistribution to rent seekers affects economic growth
and welfare.
This paper tries to answer this question. The analysis is based on the en-
dogenous growth model of Barro (1990) in which the government collects taxes
and converts the tax revenues into public services that are necessary for private
production. To introduce rent seeking into this model, it is assumed that public
funds are only partly used to provide public services. The other part of the
public funds is redistributed to agents that engage in rent seeking. Hence, the
agents decide not to use all of their time productively, but to devote some of it
to rent seeking activities.
The main result of this rent seeking growth model is that an increase in the
share of the tax revenues that is redistributed to rent seekers lowers the growth
rate. In addition, the public sector’s relative sizes that maximize growth and
welfare become also smaller in presence of redistribution.
Further, if foreign aid is introduced into this model, the relationship between
foreign aid and economic growth turns out to be inverted-U shaped under rea-
sonable policy assumptions. This result is consistent with the finding of an Aid
Laffer Curve by some recent empirical studies.
On the relationship between rent seeking and economic growth, there exists
already a well-known theoretical literature that includes Tornell and Velasco
(1992), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Lane and Tornell (1996), Tornell (1997)
and Tornell and Lane (1999). A major difference between these contributions
and this chapter here is that they assume common access to certain resources
and abstract from the role that the government and the public sector play in
the redistribution of these resources.
Contrariwise, Gelb et al. (1991) and the literature on corruption and growth
directly model how the public sector is used for redistribution. However, they
abstract from redistribution towards rent seeking private agents and focus only
on redistribution towards rent seeking public employees and politicians.
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) directly model
how the public sector is used for redistribution to private agents. However,
redistribution serves to reduce inequality in their models. Therefore, it might
2
be justifiable by ”welfare state” arguments, which it is not in the subsequently
presented model.
This model is presumably most closely related to Sturzenegger and Tommasi
(1994) and Ehrlich and Lui (1999), which present also models of rent seeking
and growth in which the public sector redistributes resources to please rent
seeking agents that need not be publicly employed. However, Sturzenegger and
Tommasi focus on the role of the distribution of political power.
In Ehrlich and Lui, agents can accumulate productive human capital as well
as political capital. Political capital allows using public power to extract rents
from those who have accumulated less political capital. A major difference
between their model and the subsequently presented model is that political
capital cannot be accumulated in the latter. Further, the public sector cannot
play any positive role in the former. It solely organizes rent extraction. It is
therefore not surprising that the growth rate decreases in the public sector’s
relative size and that growth would consequently be maximized if the public
sector were shut down. In the subsequently presented model, this result does
not hold since public services are necessary for private production.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents and solves the rent
seeking growth model. Section 3 focuses on the interdependence between rent
seeking, foreign aid and economic growth. First, it presents the findings of some
recent empirical studies on foreign aid and growth. It then introduces foreign
aid into the rent seeking growth model and discusses the results. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Rent Seeking Growth Model
This section presents the rent seeking growth model, which introduces redistri-
bution to rent seeking agents into Barro’s (1990) endogenous growth model with
a productive public sector. The first part of this section presents the setup of the
rent seeking growth model. The second derives how agents optimally allocate
their time or their efforts, respectively, to rent seeking and productive activities.
The third solves the agents’ intertemporal optimization problem. The fourth
discusses the resulting growth rate and its determinants. Thereby, the effects
of different policies on the optimal effort choices are taken into account. The
section ends with some welfare considerations.
2.1 The Setup
Given is also a closed economy with a government that provides public services
necessary for private production and with many identical private agents. In
particular, it is assumed that the economy is populated by a continuous mass n
of infinitely living agents, where n = 1.1
1The assumption that n = 1 is not crucial. However, it simplifies the presentation since
the average of any agent-specific variable thus coincides with its aggregate value.
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Each agent i seeks to maximize her overall utility
U =
∫ ∞
0
c1−σit
1− σ exp (−ρt) dt, (1)
where cit denotes her consumption in period t, ρ > 0 her discount rate and σ >
0 the inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Further,
each agent i can generate income mit in each period t by producing output
yit and by seeking rents rit. The current income mit can either be consumed
today or it can be used to accumulate capital kit, where kit represents a broad
aggregate including physical as well as human capital. In the initial period, each
agent i is endowed with the same capital stock, i.e., ki0 = k0 > 0 for all i.
The government taxes away a fixed share τ , where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, of each
agent’s production yit in each period t. The revenues from income taxation
constitute the public funds pt. Assuming further, as in the Barro model, that
the government’s budget must be balanced at all times leads to the government’s
budget constraint
pt = τyt, (2)
where aggregate output yt is given by yt =
∫ 1
0
yitdi.
But, unlike in the Barro model, only the share θ of the public funds pt is
converted into public services gt, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. The public services gt = θpt
might either be rival and excludable or nonrival and nonexcludable.2
The rest of the public funds, i.e., Rt = (1− θ)pt, is redistributed. Given the
absence of inequalities within the population of the given economy, there can
be no redistribution to reduce poverty or to lower income inequalities. All re-
distributive activities are made to please rent seeking agents. Since this chapter
focuses on explaining the consequences and not the causes of redistribution to
rent seekers, the share θ is assumed to be exogenous. However, the reason for
any θ < 1 might well be some sort of a political struggle.3
Unless θ = 1, there is a non-empty redistribution pot Rt that just waits to
be exploited. Hence, agents have an incentive to seek rents. The time agent i
devotes to rent seeking in period t, i.e., her rent seeking effort, is denoted by
eRit. However, the agents’ non-leisure time endowment is limited. Therefore,
devoting time to rent seeking has the drawback that less time can be spent on
productive activities. If the agents’ non-leisure time endowment is normalized
to one, the time agent i can use productively, i.e., her productive effort, is given
by eY it = 1− eRit.
Next, rent extraction and production technologies are introduced. The rent
2Since n = 1, the subsequently presented results are independent of the public services’
type. If n > 1, the quality of the results would still be the same for both types. However,
the resulting growth rate would in addition increase in n if public services were nonrival and
nonexcludable.
3There is no rent seeking for public services gt, just for the content of the redistribution
pot Rt. If public services are assumed to be nonrival and nonexcludable, this assumption is
particularly unrestrictive.
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extraction technology is such that agent i can extract the rent4
rit =
1
n
Rt if eRit = 0 for all i (3)
=
eRit∫ n
0
eRjtdj
Rt otherwise.
Remember that n = 1. This rent extraction technology possesses the following
reasonable properties: The rent rit that agent i can extract in period t depends
positively on her current rent seeking effort eRit and on the size of the redistri-
bution pot Rt, but negatively on the aggregate rent seeking effort. Further, it
holds that rit ≥ 0 for all i and t and that
∫ 1
0
ritdi = Rt for all t.
As in the Barro model, the production technology has decreasing returns
to capital kit and public services gt separately, but constant returns to scale.
In addition, it is assumed that agents can only make use of their accumulated
physical and human capital kit during the time they devote to productive ac-
tivities. That is, they can neither use their machines, nor their knowledge, their
skills and their experience of how to produce well and fast while they are seeking
rents. Thus, their production function, assuming a Cobb-Douglas type, is given
by
yit = A (eY itkit)
1−α
gαt , (4)
where 0 < α < 12 .
5 This condition implies, speaking somewhat carelessly, that
capital kit is more important for private production than public services gt are.
The presented structure of the model implies that the income of agent i in
period t is given by6
mit = (1− τ) yit + rit. (5)
Inserting the rent extraction technology (3) and the production technology (4)
allows rewriting income as
mit = (1− τ) A (eY itkit)1−α gαt +
eRit
eRt
Rt, (6)
where eY it = 1− eRit and eRt =
∫ 1
0
eRitdi.
In this model, each agent i has to take two different decisions in each period
t. First, she has to choose how to allocate her time or her effort, respectively,
to rent seeking and to productive activities in order to maximize her current
income mit. Second, she has to decide how much of her income mit to consume
today and how much of it to save or to invest, respectively. The agents’ optimal
effort choices are derived in section 2.2. Then, section 2.3 derives their opti-
mal consumption-saving decisions by solving their intertemporal optimization
problem.
4This rent extraction technology corresponds to Grossman’s (2001) technology for appro-
priation from a common pool, which might well have been inspired by Tullock’s (1980) rent
seeking contest success function. The latter is discussed, among others, in Hirshleifer (1989).
5The results developed in this section, i.e., in section 2, would also hold in the more general
case of 0 < α < 1. However, some results presented in section 3 would not hold if α ≥ 1
2
.
6As equation (5) implies, income mit stands actually for disposable income.
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2.2 The Effort Choices
This subsection derives each agent’s effort choice that maximizes her income mit
in period t. This is done in three steps: First, solving her income maximization
problem yields her optimal rent seeking effort as a function of the aggregate
rent seeking effort eRt, her capital stock kit, some public sector variables and
some parameters. Second, it is shown that the optimal effort choice must be
the same for all agents. This insight is then used in a third step to derive each
agent’s optimal rent seeking and productive efforts as functions of technology
and policy parameters only.
When maximizing her income mit, agent i is aware that her behavior does
neither affect the aggregate rent seeking effort eRt nor the aggregate output yt
since she has measure zero. Therefore, she takes eRt and yt as well as public
funds pt, public services gt and the redistribution pot’s content Rt as given.
Hence, to maximize her income mit in period t, which is given by equation (6),
agent i must set her rent seeking effort eRit such that the first-order condition
∂mit
∂eRit
!= 0 ⇔ Rt
eRt
= (1− τ)A (1− α) (1− eRit)−αk1−αit gαt (7)
holds. This first-order condition ensures that the marginal return to rent seeking
equals the marginal return to productive activities.
Solving this first-order condition for eRit implies that the optimal rent seek-
ing effort of agent i in response to the aggregate rent seeking effort eRt as well
as to her capital stock kit and the public sector variables gt and Rt is given by
eRit = 1−
[
(1− τ)A (1− α) k1−αit gαt eRt
Rt
] 1
α
. (8)
Since the aggregate rent seeking effort eRt and the public sector variables gt
and Rt are independent of a single agent’s effort choice and since all agents are
endowed with the same initial capital stock ki0 = k0, equation (8) implies that
all agents choose the same rent seeking effort in period 0. Combined with n = 1,
this implies e∗Ri0 = e
∗
R0 for all i, where e
∗
Ri0 denotes the optimal rent seeking
effort of agent i in period 0 and where e∗R0 =
∫ 1
0
e∗Ri0di. Since all agents have in
addition the same production technology, they all produce the same output in
period 0. Combined with n = 1, this implies yi0 = y0 = A [(1− e∗R0) k0]1−α gα0
for all i. Since the rent seeking technologies are identical too, all agents earn the
same initial income mi0. The identical preferences then ensure that all agents
take the same consumption-saving decision such that their capital stocks are still
of the same size in the subsequent period t′. Combined with n = 1, this implies
kit′ = kt′ for all i. Consequently, all agents choose again the same rent seeking
effort in this period t′ such that e∗Rit′ = e∗Rt′ for all i. This line of argument,
which could be repeated ad infinitum, implies that e∗Rit = e
∗
Rt, kit = kt and
yit = yt = A [(1− e∗Rt) kt]1−α gαt must hold for all i and t.
These insights allow to rewrite the first-order condition (7) as
Rt
e∗Rt
=
(1− τ) (1− α) yt
1− e∗Rt
.
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Then, the government’s budget constraint (2) and Rt = (1− θ)pt allow further
simplifying this condition to
(1− θ)τ
e∗Rt
=
(1− τ) (1− α)
1− e∗Rt
.
Solving for e∗Rt implies that each agent’s optimal rent seeking effort is
e∗R =
(1− θ)τ
(1− τ) (1− α) + (1− θ)τ (9)
at all times.
The optimal rent seeking effort e∗R depends negatively on θ. Therefore, the
higher the share of the public funds pt that is redistributed, the more time
the agents devote to rent seeking. Further, the optimal rent seeking effort e∗R
depends positively on the tax rate τ . Hence, the positive effects of a tax increase
on e∗R, which are due to the increases in the redistribution pot’s content Rt and
in the production share that is taxed away, exceed the negative effect, which is
due to the higher amount of public services gt provided. In addition, an increase
in the technology parameter α also increases the optimal rent seeking effort e∗R
since it decreases the marginal return to productive activities.
Since the non-leisure time endowment is equal to one, each agent’s optimal
productive effort is
e∗Y =
(1− α) (1− τ)
(1− α) (1− τ) + (1− θ) τ (10)
at all times. It increases in θ, but decreases in α and τ .
Finally, note that inserting e∗Rit = e
∗
Rt and n = 1 into the rent extraction
technology (3) implies rit = Rt for all i and t. That is, each agent i receives at
all times a rent equal to the redistribution pot’s content Rt.
2.3 The Consumption-Saving Decisions
The last subsection has derived the effort choice that maximizes the income
mit of agent i in period t. Agent i can either consume her income mit in the
current period t or she can use it to accumulate capital kit such that her future
consumption increases. This subsection solves her intertemporal optimization
problem and derives thereby her optimal consumption-saving decision.
Thereby, rent seeking and productive efforts are assumed to be independent
of time and the same for all agents such that eRit = eR and eY it = eY for all
i and t. Equations (9) and (10) imply that the optimal rent seeking effort e∗R
and the optimal productive effort e∗Y satisfy this property.
Since all agents undertake the same rent seeking effort eR and since n = 1,
each agent i can extract the rent rit = Rt at all times. As equations (5) and (6)
imply, the income of each agent i in period t can thus be written as either
mit = (1− τ) yit + Rt (11)
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or
mit = (1− τ)A (eY itkit)1−α gαt + Rt. (12)
Since all agents further have the same preferences and access to the same
technologies, it is sufficient to consider the consumption-saving decision of one
single agent.7 This representative agent maximizes her utility U subject to her
initial capital endowment k0 and the capital accumulation constraint8
·
kt= (1− τ) A (eY kt)1−α gαt + Rt − ct − δkt. (13)
Thereby, she takes the aggregate output yt and, thus, the public funds pt, the
public services gt and the redistribution pot’s content Rt again as given.
The Hamiltonian of this maximization program is
H =
c1−σt
1− σ exp (−ρt) + νt
[
(1− τ)A (eY kt)1−α gαt + Rt − ct − δkt
]
.
The corresponding first-order conditions are
c−σt exp (−ρt) = νt (14)
and
·
νt= −νt
[
(1− τ) (1− α) Ae1−αY
(
gt
kt
)α
− δ
]
. (15)
The transversality condition, which forces the capital stock’s value to be asymp-
totically zero, is
lim
t→∞
(νtkt) = 0. (16)
Taking first logs of the first-order condition (14) and then the derivatives
with respect to t yields
−σ
·
ct
ct
− ρ =
·
νt
νt
. (17)
Substituting equation (17) into the first-order condition (15) yields
γt =
1
σ
[
(1− τ) (1− α)Ae1−αY
(
gt
kt
)α
− δ − ρ
]
, (18)
where γt is defined as the consumption growth rate in period t, i.e., γt ≡
·
ct
ct
.9
The growth equation (18) has been derived without specifying the relation-
ships between tax revenues τyt, public funds pt and public services gt. However,
it is already known that the government’s budget constraint (2) and gt = θpt
7To economize on the notation, the i-subscripts are subsequently suppressed.
8A dot over a variable denotes differentiation with respect to time. So,
·
kt=
dk
dt
.
9Appendix A shows that the same consumption growth rate γ could also be derived within
a market model.
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must hold. Combining these relationships with the production function (4)
implies
gt
kt
= (Aθτ)
1
1−α eY . (19)
Inserting equation (19) into equation (18) yields the consumption growth rate
γ =
1
σ
[
(1− τ) (1− α)A 11−α (θτ) α1−α eY − δ − ρ
]
, (20)
which is exclusively determined by constant exogenous variables. It is thus
independent of time.
As usual, it is assumed in all subsequent considerations that γ ≥ −δ. Fur-
ther, it is assumed that the economy cannot be so productive that the agents’
overall utility U can become unbounded. The condition for U to be bounded
is10
ρ > (1− σ)γ. (21)
Appendix B shows that capital kt, output yt, public funds pt, public services
gt and the redistribution pot Rt must grow at the same rate as consumption
ct, i.e., at the constant rate γ. Further, there are no transitional dynamics and,
hence, no convergence between economies that differ only in their initial capital
endowments k0. As it is well known, these results are common to all growth
models of the AK type.
Equation (20) implies that the growth rate γ increases in the agents’ pro-
ductive effort eY . Hence, the economy grows faster if the agents spend most of
their time using their capital kt to produce output yt than if they devote most
of their time to rent seeking activities.
Note that any discussion of the growth effects of changes in the policy pa-
rameters θ and τ under the assumption that the agents’ effort choices were
exogenous would be exposed to a Lucas-like critique and would almost cer-
tainly lead to misleading conclusions. Therefore, discussing the growth effects
of changes in these policy parameters requires to take the effects on the agents’
effort choices into account. This is done in section 2.4.
2.4 The Growth Rate and its Determinants
This subsection combines the results of the two previous subsections. After
highlighting a first policy implication, it analyzes how the preference, technology
and policy parameters affect economic growth if their effects on the agents’ effort
choices are taken into account.
As seen in section 2.3, the growth rate γ decreases in the rent seeking effort
eR. But as seen in section 2.2, it is optimal for each single agent to choose at all
times the rent seeking effort e∗R, which is given by equation (9). This holds true
even though all agents know that growth would be higher if the aggregate rent
10For U to be bounded, it must hold that limt→∞
h
c1−σt exp (−ρt)
i
= 0. Given that ct
grows at the constant rate γ such that ct = c0 exp(γt), this condition can be rewritten as
limt→∞ exp {[(1− σ)γ − ρ] t} c1−σ0 = 0. This implies the condition ρ > (1− σ)γ.
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seeking effort eR were smaller. Hence, individual rationality does not lead to a
socially optimal outcome with respect to economic growth. This might look like
a case for a government intervention. However, the government’s ”intervention”
should be to leave the business of paying rents, i.e., to set θ = 1, such that it
becomes optimal for each agent to devote her time exclusively to productive
activities.
Before discussing the different parameters’ effect on the growth rate γ, the
optimal productive effort e∗Y , which is given by equation (10), is inserted into
the growth equation (20). This yields the growth rate
γ =
1
σ
[
(1− τ)2 (1− α)2 A 11−α (θτ) α1−α
(1− α) (1− τ) + (1− θ) τ − δ − ρ
]
. (22)
As usual in AK models, the growth rate γ increases in the technology A and
decreases in the depreciation rate δ. Further, it depends positively on the agents’
willingness to sacrifice present consumption for future consumption. This will-
ingness is the stronger, the lower the discount rate ρ is and (if and only if γ > 0)
the higher the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1σ , is.
Equation (22) implies that the growth rate γ strictly increases in the share
θ of the public funds pt that is converted into public services gt. A first reason
is that an increase in the share θ directly raises the amount of public services
gt provided. Since this does not only increase current output yt, but also the
incentive to accumulate capital kt, growth accelerates. Further, an increase
in the share θ has an additional positive effect on the growth rate γ since it
increases the productive effort e∗Y , which makes capital accumulation even more
attractive. Hence, setting θ = 1 and leaving the redistribution pot Rt empty
maximizes growth since, in this case, no agent devotes any time to rent seeking
activities and since the amount of public services gt provided is highest at each
given tax rate τ . Contrariwise, the higher the share of the public funds pt that
is redistributed to rent seekers, the slower the economy grows. The positive
dependence of the growth rate γ on the share θ is shown in figure 1.11 Further,
a tax increase has three different effects on the growth rate γ. First, a positive
effect since it increases the amount of public services gt provided, which makes
capital accumulation more attractive as argued before. Second, a direct negative
effect since it lowers the return on investments and, hence, the incentive to
accumulate capital kt. Third, an additional negative effect because it lowers the
optimal productive effort e∗Y unless θ = 1.
The growth rate γ, which is given by inserting the optimal productive effort
e∗Y into equation (20), is maximized by the tax rate that solves
∂γ
∂τ
=
(1− τ) (1− α) A 11−α (θτ) α1−α e∗Y
σ
[
α
(1− α) τ −
1
1− τ +
∂e∗Y
∂τ
1
e∗Y
]
!= 0
⇔ τ = α + (1− α) (1− τ) ετ , (23)
11The parameter values used to derive figure 1 are σ = 1, ρ = 0.02, A = 1, α = 0.2 and
δ = 0.25.
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Figure 1: Policy and Growth
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where ετ ≡ ∂e
∗
Y
∂τ
τ
e∗Y
. Equation (10) implies
ετ =
− (1− θ) τ
(1− τ) [(1− α) (1− τ) + (1− θ) τ ] . (24)
The three different growth effects of a tax increase mentioned above can be seen
in the brackets in condition (23).
Remember that the growth maximizing tax rate τ∗ equals the technology
parameter α in the Barro model such that ”roughly speaking, to maximize
the growth rate the government sets its share of gross national product, g/y, to
equal the share it would get if public services were a competitively supplied input
of production” (Barro 1990, 109). However, the third of the abovementioned
growth effects of taxation is absent in the Barro model, in which there is no
redistribution and productive efforts are implicitly assumed to be exogenous.
Condition (23) implies that the growth maximizing tax rate τ∗ equals α in
this rent seeking growth model too if the productive effort e∗Y is independent
of taxation, i.e., if ∂e
∗
Y
∂τ = 0 and hence ετ = 0. However, this requires absence
of redistribution, i.e., θ = 1. In this case, agents never devote any time to rent
seeking and the model reduces to the Barro model.
But if there is redistribution, i.e., if θ < 1, the rent seeking effort e∗R is strictly
positive and increasing in the tax rate τ . The third growth effect of taxation
mentioned above is therefore present too. Hence, the growth maximizing tax
rate τ∗ must become lower than α in this case. Condition (23) confirms that
τ < α if θ < 1 and hence ετ < 0.12
12Note that θ < 1 only implies ετ < 0 if τ > 0. But, if τ = 0, τ < α holds anyway.
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So, condition (23) implies that the growth maximizing tax rate τ∗ is a func-
tion of the parameters α and θ with the range 0 < τ∗ ≤ α. It increases in
the technology parameter α, i.e., roughly speaking, in the importance of public
services gt for private production. Further, the growth maximizing tax rate τ∗
also increases in the share θ of the public funds pt that is converted into public
services gt, as it can be seen in figure 1.
So, the implication of the Barro model that growth is maximized by setting
the relative size of the public sector, which is ptyt = τ , equal to the share it would
get if public services gt were supplied competitively does not hold in general. It
only holds if no tax revenues are redistributed to rent seekers. Otherwise, the
growth maximizing relative size of the public sector is smaller than it would be
if public services gt were supplied competitively.
2.5 Welfare Considerations
So far, the focus has been on the effects of rent seeking and different policy
parameters on the growth rate γ. However, agents do by assumption not pri-
marily care about growth, but about their overall utility U . Therefore, this
section analyzes how the utility U depends on rent seeking and on the different
policy parameters. Thereby, note that the utility U serves as a reasonable wel-
fare measure for the given economy since there is no heterogeneity among the
different agents.
As appendix C shows, the agents’ utility U increases in the growth rate γ
as well as in the initial income m0. Further, equation (11), the government’s
budget constraint (2) and Rt = (1− θ)pt imply that the initial income equals
m0 = [(1− τ) + (1− θ) τ ] y0 = (1− θτ) y0.
The production function (4) and equation (19) allow rewriting the initial income
as
m0 = (1− θτ)A
1
1−α (θτ)
α
1−α eY k0, (25)
where the productive effort eY , if chosen optimally, is given by equation (10).
These results are subsequently used to analyze how rent seeking and the policy
parameters θ and τ affect the agents’ utility U and, hence, welfare.
First, consider how utility U depends on the agents’ effort choices. Equation
(25) implies that the initial income m0 increases in the productive effort eY .
Since the growth rate γ also increases in eY , utility U must be increasing in
eY too. As growth, welfare would thus also be highest if the aggregate time
devoted to rent seeking activities were equal to zero.
Second, consider how utility U depends on the tax rate τ and on the share
θ of the public funds pt that is converted into public services gt. As seen above,
the growth rate γ is maximized if θ = 1 and τ = α. Equation (25) implies that
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maximizing the initial income m0 requires
∂m0
∂θτ
=
[
α
(1− α) θτ −
1
(1− θτ) +
∂e∗Y
∂θτ
1
e∗Y
]
m0
!= 0
⇔ θτ = a + (1− θτ) (1− α) ∂e
∗
Y
∂θτ
θτ
e∗Y
.
This condition implies that any combination of the share θ and the tax rate τ
that satisfies θτ = α would maximize the initial income m0 if
∂e∗Y
∂θτ = 0. However,
the optimal productive effort e∗Y is not independent of policy. It increases in θ
and decreases in τ . Combined with the positive effect of the productive effort
eY on m0, this implies that the initial income m0 is also maximized if θ = 1 and
τ = α. Hence, absence of redistribution and a public sector whose relative size
equals the share it would get if public services gt were supplied competitively
maximizes not only growth, but also utility U and welfare.
However, the institutions or the political agents, respectively, that determine
tax policies often differ in reality from those that determine the allocation of the
public funds. Therefore, the focus is next on the tax rate τ and on the share θ
that maximize utility U given that the other of these policy parameters is fixed.
Consider first how utility U depends on taxation given a certain share θ.
Remember that the growth maximizing tax rate τ∗ equals the technology pa-
rameter α if θ = 1, but becomes smaller than α if θ < 1 since the optimal
productive effort e∗Y decreases in the tax rate τ in this case.
Equation (25) implies that the tax rate that maximizes the initial income
m0 must satisfy
∂m0
∂τ
=
[
α
(1− α) τ −
θ
(1− θτ) +
∂e∗Y
∂τ
1
e∗Y
]
m0
!= 0 (26)
⇔ τ = 1
θ
[α + (1− α) (1− θτ) ετ ] .
This condition and equation (25) both imply that a tax increase has basically
the same three effects on the initial income m0 as it has on the growth rate
γ. First, a positive effect since it increases the provision of public services gt.
Second, a direct negative effect since a higher income share is taxed away. Third,
an indirect negative effect since the optimal productive effort e∗Y decreases in
the tax rate τ . The last of these effects is absent if and only if θ = 1, which
implies ∂e
∗
Y
∂τ = 0 and hence ετ = 0. Condition (26) indicates that the tax
rate that maximizes initial income m0, which is subsequently denoted by τm,
equals α in this case, i.e., in absence of redistribution. However, in presence of
redistribution, the initial income maximizing tax rate τm becomes lower than α
since the third effect is present too. Condition (26) indeed implies that τm < α
if θ < 1.13
In addition, it holds that τm > τ∗ if θ < 1 since the direct negative effect of
taxation on the growth rate γ is larger than the corresponding negative effect
13Appendix D proves that a tax rate τ < α is required for condition (26) to hold if θ < 1.
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on the initial income m0. The reason is that the incentive to accumulate capital
decreases in all taxes while incomes decrease only in those taxes that are not
paid back to the private agents in the form of rents.
Since utility U increases in the growth rate γ and in the initial income m0,
the tax rate that maximizes utility U and welfare, τu, must be a weighted
average of τ∗ and τm. Thus, it holds that 0 < τ∗ < τu < τm < α if θ < 1 and,
as in the Barro model, that τ∗ = τu = τm = α if θ = 1.
Finally, consider how utility U depends on the share θ of the public funds
pt that is converted into public services gt. Remember that the growth rate γ
strictly increases in θ. Thus, a sufficient condition for the utility U to be strictly
increasing in θ too is that the initial income m0 is non-decreasing in θ, i.e., that
∂m0
∂θ
=
[
(α− θτ) e∗Y + (1− α) (1− θτ) θ
∂e∗Y
∂θ
]
τ ≥ 0 (27)
⇔ θτ ≤ α + (1− α) (1− θτ) ∂e
∗
Y
∂θ
θ
e∗Y
.
Consequently, a necessary, but not sufficient condition for more redistribution,
i.e., a decrease in the share θ, to increase welfare is that inequality (27) does
not hold. Since ∂e
∗
Y
∂θ > 0, this requires a relatively high share θ and a relatively
high tax rate τ that must certainly exceed α and, thus, the rates that maximize
growth and welfare. In this case, the marginal return to public services gt
becomes so small that giving some tax revenues back to the agents in the form
of rents could increase utility U even though it lowers the productive efforts e∗Y .
Casual observations suggest that redistribution to rent seekers is seldom rare
in countries where taxes are high. Hence, scaling down redistribution might
increase not only growth, but also welfare in most countries. However, some
limited redistribution could have positive welfare effects in countries in which
taxes are suboptimally high.
3 Rent Seeking and the Aid Laffer Curve
This section discusses the effect of foreign aid on economic growth. Section 3.1
summarizes the findings of some recent empirical studies on aid effectiveness.
Several of these studies found evidence for the existence of a so-called Aid Laffer
Curve, i.e., an inverted-U shaped relationship between foreign aid and economic
growth. So far, no theoretical growth model has been able to predict an Aid
Laffer Curve, except a model proposed by Lensink and White (2001) in which
the technology is assumed to decrease in foreign aid.
Section 3.2 introduces foreign aid into the rent seeking growth model that
has been presented in section 2. Given particular assumptions concerning the
aid pattern and the policy in the aid recipient country14, this modified model
14As customary, the expression of the aid recipient country is used throughout this section.
However, Bauer (1991) rightfully asks us to keep in mind at all times that the recipients of
official foreign aid are always governments.
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predicts an inverted-U shaped relationship between foreign aid and the growth
rate. Hence, it might reveal parts of the mechanisms that lead to the observed
Aid Laffer Curve.
Section 3.3 discusses the importance of the two abovementioned assump-
tions for the model’s prediction of an Aid Laffer Curve. It suggests alternative
assumptions and shows whether and how they would alter the results.
3.1 Empirical Evidence on Foreign Aid and Growth
This subsection gives an overview of the recent empirical literature on the rela-
tionship between foreign aid and economic growth.15 First, it briefly summarizes
the influential contribution of Burnside and Dollar (2000) and their main find-
ings. It then presents different empirical studies that challenge the findings of
Burnside and Dollar. Some of these studies find evidence for an Aid Laffer
Curve.
Burnside and Dollar focus on the interdependence between aid, policy and
economic growth. They construct a policy index containing the budget surplus,
the inflation rate and a measure of trade openness. Beside aid and this policy
index, they add the interaction term between aid and policy to the indepen-
dent variables.16 The inclusion of this interaction term makes the relationship
between aid and growth non-linear. The main findings of Burnside and Dollar
are the following: First, policy has a significantly positive effect on the growth
rate. Second, foreign aid has no significant effect on the growth rate on average.
Third, the aid-policy interaction term has a significant effect on the growth
rate. Combining the last two findings implies that foreign aid has a positive
effect on growth, but only in countries with a good policy environment. The
result that good policies do not only have a direct positive effect on growth, but
make in addition aid payments work has attracted a great deal of attention in
the public discussion and has strongly influenced the views of policymakers and
multinational aid agencies such as the World Bank.17
However, the Burnside-Dollar study has been questioned for different rea-
sons. First, Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) and Easterly (2003), both using the
same data as Burnside and Dollar, doubt the robustness of the Burnside-Dollar
findings. In particular, Dalgaard and Hansen find that the significance of the
aid-policy interaction term depends crucially on the exclusion of a certain set of
outliers. Easterly, on the other hand, finds that this interaction term becomes
insignificant for alternative definitions of aid, of policy and of growth that seem
equally plausible as the definitions used by Burnside and Dollar.
Second, Easterly et al. (2004) extend the data set of Burnside and Dollar
and show that the aid-policy interaction becomes insignificant if they use this
15See Hansen and Trap (2000) for an overview and a discussion of the empirical literature
on foreign aid and economic growth since the beginning of the 1970s.
16In all empirical studies mentioned, the aid term refers to official foreign aid payments as
a share of GDP.
17Easterly (2003) provides some examples of how policymakers, aid agencies and the media
have referred either explicitly or implicitly to the findings of Burnside and Dollar.
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extended data set.
Third, Dalgaard and Hansen, Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Lensink and
White (2001) consider a different non-linear relationship between foreign aid
and the growth rate than Burnside and Dollar. They include aid squared as in-
dependent variable instead of the aid-policy interaction term. They all find that
this alternative model formulation is statistically preferable to the formulation
of Burnside and Dollar. Given this formulation including aid squared, each of
the three abovementioned studies finds that the marginal growth effect of an
increase in aid is initially positive, but decreasing. Further, the turning point
for which the marginal growth effect becomes negative is found to be within the
sample range in each of these studies.18 Hence, Lensink and White argue that
there is evidence for an Aid Laffer Curve.
Further, Dalgaard and Hansen as well as Lensink and White challenge also
another finding of Burnside and Dollar. They find that on average foreign aid
has a significant positive effect on growth. However, Boone (1996) and Svensson
(1999) also fail to find a significant growth effect of foreign aid on average.
3.2 Foreign Aid and the Rent Seeking Growth Model
In this subsection, foreign aid is introduced into the rent seeking growth model.
Therefore, suppose that a foreign country or a multinational organization such
as the World Bank decides to make some aid payments Ft to the government of
the economy presented in section 2. More general, Ft could stand for any kind
of windfall gains that increase the public funds pt.
Since the economy is still assumed to be closed, these aid payments Ft are the
only connection between the aid recipient country and the outside world. This
assumption is, of course, somewhat restrictive. However, many aid recipient
countries, particularly in Sub-Sahara Africa, are indeed poorly integrated into
the global trading system and their access to the global capital markets seems
often limited.19
The aid payments Ft are assumed to be fungible such that the government
in the aid recipient country can decide how to use them. This can either mean
that the aid payments are unconditional or that the donor cannot or does not
want to enforce the conditions. In addition, aid payments that are used for
the intended projects can have the same impact as fungible aid payments if
the aid recipient country channels other resources away from this project. The
assumption that aid payments are fungible is consistent with the findings of
Feyzioglu et al. (1998) and the World Bank’s (1998) ”Assessing Aid” report,
which concludes that aid appears to be largely fungible.
Of course, the pattern of the aid payments Ft over time could take many
18However, the turning points, i.e., the aid values at which the Aid Laffer Curve peaks,
differ substantially among these three studies.
19Note that foreign trade and international capital markets are for simplicity ruled out in
most standard growth models even though the majority of these models focuses on growth
in developed countries, which are in general far more integrated into global markets than
developing countries.
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different forms. However, assume that the aid payments Ft the recipient country
receives in period t are proportional to its current output yt. Thus,
Ft = fyt
for all t, where the constant aid ratio f > 0. The main reason for choosing this
particular aid pattern is that it allows solving the model analytically. Further-
more, it satisfies the more recent claim that donors should reward aid recipient
countries that promote growth seriously and successfully.20 Section 3.3.1 dis-
cusses how the subsequently derived results might change if aid payments Ft
were not proportional to output yt.
Fungible aid payments Ft primarily change the budget of the government in
the aid recipient country. If the budget must still be balanced at all times, the
government’s budget constraint becomes
pt = (τ + f) yt. (28)
This new budget constraint, the production function (4) and gt = θpt imply
gt
kt
= [Aθ (τ + f)]
1
1−α eY . (29)
Inserting this expression into the growth equation (18), which has been derived
without any specific assumption about the government’s budget, yields the con-
sumption growth rate
γ =
1
σ
{
(1− τ) (1− α) A 11−α [θ (τ + f)] α1−α eY − δ − ρ
}
. (30)
Since the consumption growth rate γ is constant, it can be shown that capital
kt, output yt, public funds pt, public services gt and the redistribution pot Rt
grow at the same rate γ.21
Equation (30) implies that the growth rate γ would be strictly increasing in
the aid ratio f if the productive effort eY were independent of f . However, the
agents’ effort choices depend of course on the (marginal) returns to rent seeking
and productive activities. Therefore, consider how the private agents allocate
their non-leisure time endowment to rent seeking and productive activities in
presence of foreign aid.
Each single agent’s income mt is still given by equation (6), but public
services gt and the redistribution pot Rt are now financed by the tax revenues
τyt and by the aid payments Ft. Since equation (6) still determines each agent’s
income mt, each agent still chooses her rent seeking effort such that the first-
order condition (7) holds. Then, by following closely the argumentation outlined
20See, e.g., Easterly (2001, 119): ”As countries’ incomes rise because of their favorable
policies, aid should increase in matching fashion. ... (Granted, at the beginning of a new aid
regime, the poor countries should be the ones designated to be eligible for aid.)”
21See again appendix B.
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in section 2.2, it can be shown that each single agent’s optimal rent seeking effort
must be given by
ef∗R =
(1− θ) (τ + f)
(1− α) (1− τ) + (1− θ) (τ + f) (31)
at all times. It increases in the aid ratio f unless θ = 1, i.e., unless there is no
redistribution. The increase in the optimal rent seeking effort ef∗R that foreign
aid causes is the larger, the lower the share θ is, i.e., the more the government
redistributes to rent seeking agents.
Equation (31) and the agents’ non-leisure time endowment of one imply that
each agent’s optimal productive effort in presence of foreign aid is
ef∗Y =
(1− α) (1− τ)
(1− α) (1− τ) + (1− θ) (τ + f) (32)
at all times. It decreases in the aid ratio f unless θ = 1.
Inserting the optimal productive effort ef∗Y into equation (30) yields the
growth rate
γ =
1
σ
{
(1− α)2 (1− τ)2A 11−α [θ (τ + f)] α1−α
(1− α) (1− τ) + β (1− θ) (τ + f) − δ − ρ
}
. (33)
In the following discussion on aid effectiveness, it is assumed that not only
technology and preference parameters, but also policy parameters are indepen-
dent of foreign aid or of the ratio f , respectively. The assumption that foreign
aid does not affect policy in the aid recipient country is consistent with recent
evidence. Dollar and Svensson (2000) find that foreign aid does not seem to
influence policy. Feyzioglu et al. (1998, 27) find ”that a dollar given in offi-
cial development assistance to developing countries does not lead to a tax relief
effect; instead, it causes government spending to increase by a dollar.” Never-
theless, section 3.3.2 discusses how the results would change under alternative
assumptions about the government’s behavior.
Given that policy is aid independent, foreign aid has two different effects on
the growth rate γ. A positive effect, since aid payments Ft add resources to the
public funds pt such that the amount of public services gt provided increases.
Consequently, private production yt increases and capital accumulation becomes
more attractive such that economic growth accelerates. This is the reason why
equation (30) implies that the growth rate γ would be strictly increasing in the
aid ratio f if the productive effort eY were held constant. Equation (30) further
shows that the marginal growth effect of foreign aid decreases even in this case
in the aid ratio f since α < 12 .
But unless there is no redistribution to rent seekers, i.e., unless θ = 1, foreign
aid has also a negative effect on the growth rate γ since it increases the optimal
rent seeking effort ef∗R and decreases, consequently, the optimal productive effort
ef∗Y decreases. Even though Bauer (1981, 1991) has repeatedly pointed at this
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negative growth effect of foreign aid, it has often been ignored by supporters of
generous aid schemes.22,23
Taking the derivative of the growth rate γ, which is given by inserting the
optimal productive effort ef∗Y into equation (30), with respect to the aid ratio f
yields
∂γ
∂f
=
1
σ
[
α
(1− α) (τ + f) +
∂ef∗Y
∂f
1
ef∗Y
]
(1− τ) (1− α) A 11−α [θ (τ + f)] α1−α ef∗Y .
(34)
Equation (32) implies
∂ef∗Y
∂f
1
ef∗Y
=
− (1− θ)
(1− α) (1− τ) + (1− θ) (τ + f) . (35)
The two countervailing growth effects of foreign aid mentioned above can be
seen in the first brackets in equation (34).
The equations (34) and (35) imply that the marginal growth effect of foreign
aid is the higher at each given aid ratio f , the lower the tax rate τ is and the
less the government redistributes, i.e., the higher θ is.24
Further, they imply that growth is maximized if f = f∗, where
f∗ =
α (1− α) (1− τ)
(1− 2α) (1− θ) − τ. (36)
The growth maximizing aid ratio f∗ decreases in the tax rate τ , but increases
in the share θ of the public funds pt that is converted into public services gt
as well as in the technology parameter α, which measures, roughly speaking,
the importance of public services gt for private production. It depends on these
parameters whether the growth maximizing aid ratio f∗ is positive or negative.
Moreover, the equations (34) and (35) imply that ∂γ∂f > 0 if f < f
∗ and
that ∂γ∂f < 0 if f > f
∗. Hence, the first, positive of the abovementioned effects
typically dominates if the aid ratio f is relatively small whereas the second,
22See, e.g., Bauer (1981, 104): ”Foreign aid has done much to politicize life in the Third
World. ... People divert their resources and attention from productive economic activity into
other areas. ... This direction of people’s activities and resources must damage the economic
performance and development of a society.”
23Another reason why transfer payments can have a negative effect on the recipient country
is discussed in the literature on the so-called transfer problem: Transfer payments can lead to
a change in the terms of trade that is unfavorable for the recipient country. Leontief (1936)
first mentioned the possibility that the negative consequences of this change in the terms of
trade could even exceed the transfer payments’ direct positive effect such that ”real wealth
might be transferred ... in the opposite direction” to the transfer payments (Leontief 1936,
91).
24Since this model implies that the growth effect of foreign aid tends to be positive if and
only if taxes are not too high and redistribution to rent seekers not too widespread, it might
seem to be compatible with the Burnside-Dollar finding that aid works, but only within a good
policy environment. However, they measure good policy by fiscal and monetary stability and
by trade openness. But here, the budget is balanced by assumption, money is absent and
trade ruled out. Therefore, it can hardly be argued that the Burnside-Dollar finding is met.
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negative effect typically dominates if f is relatively high. As f increases, the
marginal and even the total growth effect of foreign aid must become negative
at some point unless θ = 1, i.e., unless there is no redistribution.
Hence, the two countervailing effects of foreign aid lead to a relationship be-
tween the aid ratio f and the growth rate γ that is inverted-U shaped. Therefore,
this rent seeking growth model predicts an Aid Laffer Curve if f∗ > 0, given
that aid payments Ft are proportional to the current output yt and that they
do not affect policy in the aid recipient country.
In spite of these reservations, this model might reveal parts of the mecha-
nisms that lead to the Aid Laffer Curve found by Dalgaard and Hansen (2001),
Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Lensink and White (2001). Foreign aid might
promote growth if given in small dosages since it allows providing more public
services that support private production. However, large dosages of foreign aid
might harm growth since it induces people to allocate most of their time and
of their resources to rent seeking activities in order to channel some of the aid
inflows towards themselves.
Further, the model implies that even small dosages of foreign aid might slow
down growth in some aid recipient countries, namely in those in which f∗ < 0.
These countries would actually grow faster if foreign aid took the form of taking
away parts of the public funds pt instead of adding resources to them. This
would be true even if it included proportional theft of public services gt. In
these countries, the negative growth effect of the increase in rent seeking that
the first aid dollar causes exceeds already the positive growth effect of increasing
public services gt by θ dollars.
Finally, note that the relationship between the agents’ overall utility U and
the aid ratio f is also inverted-U shaped if θ < 1. The aid ratio f that maximizes
utility U depends also positively on the share θ, but negatively on the tax rate
τ . However, it exceeds the growth maximizing aid ratio f∗. Nevertheless, it
might still be negative if redistribution is widespread and taxes high. In this
case, the first aid dollar already harms the agents in the aid recipient country.
Otherwise, relatively small aid payments Ft or a relatively low aid ratio f ,
respectively, increase the agents’ utility U and, hence, welfare. But huge aid
payments Ft can rarely be in the interest of the private agents in the aid recipient
country. However, they might well be in the interest of the agents in the donor
countries if these payments are directly subtracted from the public funds pt
or even from the redistribution pots Rt and if the governments in the donor
countries redistribute extensively.
3.3 The Role of Some Assumptions
In section 3.2, it has been assumed that aid payments are proportional to pri-
vate production and that policy parameters are aid independent. Given these
assumptions, the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth turned
out to be inverted-U shaped such that it could be described by an Aid Laffer
Curve if it peaked at a positive aid ratio. It is next analyzed whether and how
this result changes given alternative assumptions.
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3.3.1 The Role of the Aid Pattern
This subsection briefly discusses how the results derived in section 3.2 change if
aid payments Ft are not proportional to current output yt, i.e., if the aid ratio
ft = Ftyt varies over time.
If the aid ratio ft varies over time, the consumption growth rate γt as well as
the optimal effort choices vary over time too. As the consumption growth rate
γt is no longer constant, the growth rates of capital kt, output yt and, hence,
the public sector variables pt, gt and Rt differ in general from the consumption
growth rate γt.
But the consumption growth rate γt still increases (decreases) in the aid
payments Ft if ft < (>) f∗. Thus, neither the prediction of an inverted-U
shaped relationship between the aid ratio ft and the consumption growth rate
γt, nor the finding that it peaks at a positive aid ratio ft if and only if f∗ > 0
depends on the assumption that aid payments Ft are proportional to current
output yt. The relationship between foreign aid and the output growth rate, on
the other hand, might not be inverted-U shaped since output yt does in general
not grow at the same rate as consumption ct if ft is non-constant.
Unfortunately, solving the model analytically becomes impossible if the aid
ratio ft and, consequently, the consumption growth rate γt are non-constant.
3.3.2 The Role of the Government’s Response to Aid
In section 3.2, the growth effect of foreign aid has been assessed under the as-
sumption that aid inflows do not affect policy in the aid recipient country. The
relationship between aid and growth has turned out to be inverted-U shaped.
This subsection highlights that this result depends crucially on the assumed
government behavior. It shows that aid payments would unambiguously accel-
erate growth under the assumption that the aid recipient country’s government
responded to these payments in the way that promotes growth best. It then
argues that such an assumption poorly approximates the behavior of most aid
recipient countries’ governments.
Suppose the government in the aid recipient country responds to foreign
aid in the way that promotes growth best. In this case, the growth rate γ is
still determined by equation (33), which has been derived without any specific
assumption about government behavior. Nevertheless, the implications of this
growth equation change dramatically. The growth rate γ becomes strictly in-
creasing in the aid ratio f . For this, the government in the aid recipient country
only has to adjust the tax rate τ accurately in response to foreign aid.
Foreign aid allows to decrease the tax rate τ or to revert it even into a
subsidy and, at the same time, to provide more public services gt. Lower taxes
decrease the rent seeking effort ef∗R . Higher productive efforts e
f∗
Y and higher
public services gt both raise private production yt. Therefore, foreign aid makes
accumulating capital kt unambiguously more attractive such that the growth
rate γ in the aid recipient country increases. In addition, aid inflows also increase
the agents’ utility U and, hence, welfare if the government adjusts the tax rate
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τ as described above.
However, such a favorable adjustment of the tax rate τ requires, among
others, that the government is willing to implement a new and most likely lower
tax rate τ . Given that the government and the public employees might prefer
a large public sector for reasons outlined by, e.g., Niskanen (1968, 1971), the
government’s willingness to reduce the public sector’s relative size by cutting
taxes might be limited. Furthermore, adequate tax reductions also require that
the government has the relevant information as well as the power to enforce
them. Given that foreign aid is mostly paid to poor and slow growing countries,
governments of aid recipient countries might in general not be simultaneously
benevolent, well-informed and powerful.
As an example, consider the model economy presented in section 2. It grows
slow and is thus relatively poor in the long run if most of the public funds
are given to rent seekers and if taxes are either very high or very low. Such an
economy is hardly blessed with a government that is simultaneously benevolent,
well-informed and powerful.
Further, there is no reason to believe that the inflow of fungible aid payments
should substantially change the characteristics of the government.
Hence, it might be more appropriate to base the discussion about the growth
effects of foreign aid on assumptions that are not incompatible with governments
that are either selfish, weak or lack good information and that do, consequently,
not respond to foreign aid in the way that would be best for the private agents
in their country.
The previously used assumption that the government is completely passive
such that policy is aid independent, which is consistent with some recent evi-
dence, is such an assumption. It corresponds to a weak government that may
lack good information.
4 Conclusions
In the introduction, the question has been posed how the transfer payments
that governments all over the world make to please rent seekers might affect
economic growth and welfare. To answer this question, rent seeking has been
introduced into the endogenous growth model of Barro (1990), which leads to
a production decrease and makes accumulating physical and human capital less
attractive. Thus, redistribution to rent seekers decelerates economic growth and
tends to lower welfare.
Before discussing some results and implications of this rent seeking growth
model, notice that it can capture coordination failures states can solve as well
as coordination failures they frequently create.25 It is often claimed that a
reason for the existence of states is that they help to escape prisoners’ dilemma-
like situations. In the presented model, the public sector can indeed serve this
25These ”wealth-creating and wealth-impeding dimensions” of the state are discussed in
Brunner (1985). See Buchanan (1975) for a related and more extensive discussion.
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purpose if public services are nonrival and nonexcludable such that too few
would be produced in absence of a state or a government, respectively.
But furthermore, government interventions can also create coordination fail-
ures. Especially, but not exclusively, if these interventions contain transfer
payments that cannot be justified by meaningfully defined ”welfare state” ar-
guments. Today, this drawback is still often ignored even though Bastiat wrote
already over 150 years ago that ”the state is the great fictitious entity by which
everyone seeks to live at the expense of everyone else” (Bastiat 1995, 144). In
the presented model, the redistribution to rent seekers creates such a coordina-
tion failure. As soon as the government redistributes some of its public funds,
it becomes optimal for each single agent to devote her time partly to rent seek-
ing activities even though each agent knows that all agents would be better
off if they all devoted less time to rent seeking activities. Therefore, a benev-
olent government should not engage in redistribution to rent seekers. This is
the government’s only possibility to avoid the creation of such a coordination
failure.
In the presented model, economic growth and welfare depend further on tax-
ation and the public sector’s size. In absence of redistribution, a tax increase
affects growth positively since it increases the provision of public services, but
negatively since it makes capital accumulation less attractive. It is known since
Barro (1990) that, given a Cobb-Douglas production function, growth and wel-
fare are maximized in absence of redistribution if the public sector’s relative
size equals the share it would get if public services were a competitively sup-
plied production input. However, if there is redistribution, a tax increase has
an additional negative effect since it increases the agents’ rent seeking efforts.
Therefore, the public sector’s relative sizes that maximize growth and welfare
become smaller in presence of redistribution to rent seekers.
In addition, introducing foreign aid into the rent seeking growth model leads
to the prediction of an inverted-U shaped relationship between foreign aid and
economic growth if the government in the aid recipient country responds pas-
sively to foreign aid. This model might therefore reveal parts of the mechanisms
that lead to the Aid Laffer Curve for which some recent empirical studies pro-
vide evidence. Foreign aid might promote growth if given in small dosages since
it increases the provision of public services that are supportive for private pro-
duction. However, large dosages of foreign aid might harm growth since they
induce agents to allocate most of their time and their resources to rent seeking
activities in order to channel aid inflows towards themselves.
Further, the model implies that foreign aid tends to be less useful or more
harmful, respectively, if taxes are high and redistribution widespread. Hence,
large aid payments to countries in which the public sector is already relatively
large might be useless or even destructive. Moreover, foreign aid should pri-
marily be paid to countries where redistribution to rent seekers is rare. Un-
fortunately, it is often difficult in reality to distinguish rents form payments
that are necessary to provide public services. As an example, big investment
projects that lead to the provision of some public goods or services involve in
many countries often favors to rent seekers.
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Furthermore, applying this model to the current enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union yields an interesting hypothesis: The transfer payments will only
support economic development in the new Central and Eastern European mem-
ber states if these states succeed in limiting redistribution to rent seekers. But
if they set high taxes and redistribute widely, the transfer payments will retard
their development.
Due to the similarity between aid windfalls and natural resource windfalls,
the model also offers a potential explanation of why many resource-rich countries
grow slowly: Natural resources could lower growth in countries with widespread
redistribution since they cause rent seeking in such countries.
As a corollary of the question posed at the beginning, this model explicitly
focuses on the effects of redistribution and rent seeking on economic growth
and welfare. The tax rate and the allocation of the public funds are therefore
assumed to be exogenous. But policies are of course not exogenous to a society,
at least in the long run. Future research might therefore advance this model
or any other model that assesses the interactions between rent seeking, policies
and growth in such a way that it can explain policies too.
Most interesting might be to model policies as the explicit outcome of a
political struggle between different (interest) groups. However, it seems difficult
to introduce this approach into a growth model such as the one presented in
this paper in which policy is multidimensional.26
Thus, a shortcut could be taken by making ad hoc assumptions about how
policy variables are related to some other characteristics of the economy. As
an example, the share of the public funds that is redistributed to rent seekers
could be increasing in the public sector’s size. Alternatively, this share might
increase in the aggregate rent seeking effort. In both cases, the negative effects
of high taxes and large public sectors would become stronger in the presented
model. In addition, foreign aid would tend to be less beneficial or more harmful,
respectively.
26The models of Tornell and Velasco (1992), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Lane and
Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) could be interpreted as models in which the
struggle between different interest groups determines policy. However, policy just contains
one dimension - the redistribution of common access resources - in these models.
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5 Appendices
5.1 Appendix A
In section 2.3, the consumption growth rate γ is derived under the assumption
that the private agents produce at home. This appendix shows that the same
results can be derived by assuming that production is done by firms that rent
capital from the private agents.
The private agents maximize their overall utility U subject to k0 and the
dynamic constraint
·
kt= ωkt − ct − δkt,
where ω is the return to their capital kt.27 They take ω as given. The repre-
sentative private agent’s dynamic optimization program written as Hamiltonian
is
H =
(
c1−σt
1− σ
)
exp (−ρt) + νt (ωkt − ct − δkt) .
The corresponding first-order conditions are condition (14), which can again be
modified to get equation (17), and
·
νt= −νt (ω − δ) . (37)
Then, equation (17) and the first-order condition (37) imply
γ =
1
σ
(ω − δ − ρ) , (38)
where γ is again defined as the consumption growth rate.
Firms are assumed to produce output yt with the production function
yt = A (k′t)
1−α
gαt ,
where k′t = eY kt. For the firms, the capital variable k′t rather than kt is relevant
since they cannot use the private agents’ capital, especially their human capital,
while the private agents are seeking rents. Each firm takes the return on k′t, ω
′,
as given and maximizes its profit (1− τ)yt − ω′k′t. The first-order condition of
the firms’ problem is
ω′ = (1− τ) (1− α)A
(
gt
k′t
)α
. (39)
In equilibrium, it must hold that ωkt = ω′k′t and, hence, that ω = eY ω′.
The first-order condition (39) can thus be rewritten as
ω = (1− τ) (1− α)Ae1−αY
(
gt
kt
)α
. (40)
27Note that the private agents’ wealth might also include bonds besides their capital. But
because the economy is closed, the net supply of bonds is zero.
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Inserting condition (40) into equation (38) yields again the growth equation
(18).
Thus, the consumption growth rate γ turns out to be exactly the same in
this market model as in the model in which the private agents produce at home.
5.2 Appendix B
This appendix proves that the capital stock kt, output yt, public funds pt, public
services gt and the redistribution pot Rt grow at the same rate as consumption
ct, i.e., at the constant rate γ. Since this result holds in section 2 as well as in
section 3.2, the proof is made for the more general case. Thus, the aid ratio
f is included. Just set f = 0 to get the proof that corresponds to the model
specification in section 2.28
To start, note that the government’s budget constraint (28) [constraint (2)],
Rt = (1 − θ)pt and equation (29) [equation (19)] allow rewriting the capital
accumulation equation (13) as
·
kt= (Ψ− δ) kt − ct, (41)
where
Ψ ≡ ϕA 11−α [θ (τ + f)] α1−α eY
and
ϕ ≡ (1− τ) + (1− θ) (τ + f) = 1 + (1− θ) f − θτ.
Since the consumption growth rate γ, which is given by equation (30) [equa-
tion (20)], is constant, it holds that
ct = c0 exp (γt) = c0 exp
[
1
σ
(Ω− δ − ρ) t
]
, (42)
where
Ω ≡ (1− τ) (1− α) A 11−α [θ (τ + f)] α1−α eY .
Note that ϕ > (1 − τ) (1− α) since α > 0, f ≥ 0 and θ ≤ 1. Hence, it must
hold that Ψ > Ω.
Inserting equation (42) into the modified capital accumulation equation (41)
yields
·
kt= (Ψ− δ) kt − c0 exp
[
1
σ
(Ω− δ − ρ) t
]
. (43)
The general solution to this first-order, linear differential equation is next
derived in six steps.29 First, equation (43) is rewritten as
·
kt − (Ψ− δ) kt = −c0 exp
[
1
σ
(Ω− δ − ρ) t
]
.
28It is referred to some equations of section 3.2. In these cases, the equivalent equations of
section 2, where f = 0, are given in brackets.
29The derivation of this general solution follows Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
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Second, both sides are multiplied by exp [− (Ψ− δ) t]. This yields
[ ·
kt − (Ψ− δ) kt
]
exp [− (Ψ− δ) t] = −c0 exp (−Wt) ,
where
W ≡ 1
σ
[ρ− Ω + σΨ + (1− σ) δ] .
Note that W is constant. Third, both sides are integrated such that
∫ [ ·
kt − (Ψ− δ) kt
]
exp [− (Ψ− δ) t] dt = −c0
∫
exp (−Wt) dt. (44)
Fourth, note that the integral on the left-hand side of equation (44) is the
integral of the derivative of a function. Thus, it equals the function itself, i.e.,
∫ [ ·
kt − (Ψ− δ) kt
]
exp [− (Ψ− δ) t] dt = exp [− (Ψ− δ) t] kt + q1,
where q1 is an arbitrary constant. Fifth, solving for the right-hand side of equa-
tion (44) yields
−c0
∫
exp (−Wt) dt = c0
W
exp (−Wt) + q2,
where q2 is also an arbitrary constant. Thus, equation (44) can be rewritten as
exp [− (Ψ− δ) t] kt + q1 = c0
W
exp (−Wt) + q2.
Finally, solving for the capital stock kt yields
kt = Q exp [(Ψ− δ) t] + c0
W
exp [(Ψ− δ −W ) t] ,
where Q = q2 − q1. This equation can be rewritten as
kt = Q exp [(Ψ− δ) t] + c0
W
exp
[
1
σ
(Ω− δ − ρ) t
]
. (45)
Equation (45) is the general solution to the first-order, linear differential equa-
tion (43).
Further, the first-order condition (15) and equation (29) [equation (19)] im-
ply
νt = ν0 exp [− (Ω− δ) t] . (46)
Inserting equations (45) and (46) into the transversality condition (16) yields
lim
t→∞
Q exp [(Ψ− Ω) t] + lim
t→∞
c0
W
exp
{
1
σ
[(1− σ) (Ω− δ)− ρ] t
}
= 0. (47)
The bounded utility condition (21) implies ρ > (1− σ) (Ω− δ) . Thus, the sec-
ond term of condition (47) converges towards zero. Consequently, this condition
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requires that the first term converges towards zero too. Since Ψ > Ω, this re-
quires Q = 0.
Given Q = 0, equations (42) and (45) imply
kt =
1
W
ct.
Since W is constant, the growth rate of the capital stock kt must equal the
consumption growth rate γ.
Further, equation (29) [equation (19)] implies that public services gt must
grow at the same rate as kt. Then, the production function (4) implies that
output yt must also grow at this rate γ. Finally, the government’s budget
constraint (28) [constraint (2)] implies that public funds pt and, consequently,
the redistribution pot Rt must grow at the rate γ as well.
5.3 Appendix C
This appendix proves that the agents’ utility U increases in the growth rate γ
and in the initial income m0.
Since the consumption growth rate γ is constant such that ct = c0 exp (γt)
and since the bounded utility condition (21) holds, the agents’ overall utility U ,
which is given by equation (1), can be rewritten as
U =
c1−σ0
(1− σ) [ρ− (1− σ) γ] . (48)
The capital accumulation equation (13), equation (12) and the result that
capital kt grows at the rate γ imply that initial consumption must be given by
c0 = m0 − (γ + δ) k0. (49)
Hence, the utility function (48) can be rewritten as
U =
[m0 − (γ + δ) k0]1−σ
(1− σ) [ρ− (1− σ) γ] . (50)
The derivative of this utility function with respect to the initial income m0
is given by
∂U
∂m0
=
[m0 − (γ + δ) k0]−σ
ρ− (1− σ) γ .
The bounded utility (21) condition implies that the denominator must be pos-
itive. It follows from equation (49) that the numerator is also positive unless
c0 ≤ 0. But any c0 < 0 is infeasible and c0 = 0 cannot maximize utility U since
it would lead to ct = 0 for all t. Hence, it must hold that c0 > 0 and that the
numerator is positive too. Therefore, ∂U∂m0 > 0.
The derivative of the utility function (50) with respect to the growth rate γ
is given by
∂U
∂γ
=
[m0 − (γ + δ) k0]1−σ − [ρ− (1− σ) γ] [m0 − (γ + δ) k0]−σ k0
[ρ− (1− σ) γ]2 .
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Note that ∂U∂γ ≤ 0 if and only if
m0 − (γ + δ) k0 ≤ [ρ− (1− σ) γ] k0 ⇔ m0
k0
≤ ρ + σγ + δ. (51)
The growth equation (20) implies that
ρ + σγ + δ = (1− τ) (1− α)A 11−α (θτ) α1−α eY
and equation (25) that
m0
k0
= (1− θτ)A 11−α (θτ) α1−α eY .
These two equations allow rewriting the weak inequality (51) as
1− θτ ≤ (1− τ) (1− α) .
Since α > 0 and θ ≤ 1, this weak inequality does not hold. Consequently, there
is a contradiction and it must hold that ∂U∂γ > 0.
5.4 Appendix D
This appendix proves that a tax rate τ < α is required for condition (26) to
hold if θ < 1.
Suppose condition (26) is satisfied by a tax rate τ ≥ α if θ < 1. In this case,
it must hold that
1
θ
[α + (1− α) (1− θτ) ετ ] ≥ α ⇔ (1− α) (1− θτ) ετ ≥ − (1− θ)α.
After inserting equation (24), this condition can be rewritten as
− (1− θ) (1− α) (1− θτ) τ ≥ − (1− θ) α(1− τ) [(1− α) (1− τ) + (1− θ) τ ] .
Dividing both sides by the negative term − (1− θ) yields
(1− α) (1− θτ) τ ≤ α(1− τ) [(1− α) (1− τ) + (1− θ) τ ] .
Straightforward, but tedious algebra allows rewriting this condition as
(1− θτ) (τ − α) + (1− τ)2 α2 ≤ 0.
Given τ ≥ α and θ < 1 this condition cannot hold. Hence, there is a contra-
diction. Consequently, a tax rate τ < α is required for condition (26) to hold if
θ < 1.
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